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Discrimination in Housing
In O'Meara v. Washington State Bd.
Against Discrimination,' a recent Washing-
ton case, respondent offered for sale the
home he had purchased in 1955 with the
aid of a private loan insured by the FHA.
Petitioner, a negro, attempted to purchase
it, leaving a deposit with respondent's wife
over her objection. Upon the return of the
deposit petitioner lodged a complaint with
the Washington State Board Against Dis-
crimination. The Board found, pursuant to
a 1957 statute2 which provided against dis-
crimination in "publicly-assisted" housing,
that respondent's home was "publicly-
assisted" and that his refusal to sell was
motivated by discrimination. The Board
then ordered respondent to sell. Upon his
refusal to do so, the Board brought an ac-
tion in Superior Court to enforce its order
and a successful defense was made on the
ground that the 1957 statute was unconsti-
tutional. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Washington affirmed the ruling of the lower
court and held that the statute was a viola-
tion of the "equal protection" clause of
the federal constitution and the "privileges
and immunities" clause of the state
constitution.
Attempts to prevent discrimination in
the vital area of housing have taken two
forms. The first method has been to assail
the alleged discrimination as being viola-
tive of the fourteenth amendment. The
other mode, a more recent one, has been
to enact state legislation.
In 1948 the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Shelley v. Kraemer,' held that a
racially restrictive covenant was not barred
- Wash. 2d -, 365 P.2d 1 (1961).
2 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (1957).
3 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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by the Constitution, but that a state court
could not enforce such a covenant since
the enforcement would violate the indi-
vidual's right to equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Earlier, in Buchanan v. Warley,4 the
same Court had declared unconstitutional
a Louisville ordinance which zoned resi-
dential areas on the basis of race. In that
case the Court held that the ordinance's
restriction on alienation of property vio-
lated the seller's right to equal protection.
From these decisions, particularly that in
Shelley, the "state action" theory has de-
veloped, namely, that the state, or any
political subdivision thereof, cannot act in
such a way as to violate an individual's
right to equal protection of the laws.5
In Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp.6
the New York Court of Appeals was faced
with the problem of discrimination in a
low-rent housing project. Pursuant to a
state redevelopment law the City of New
York consolidated the ownership of a large
section of property by eminent domain and
sold it to the Stuyvesant Town Corpora-
tion, a private company. A twenty-five
year tax relief on improvements was also
granted the corporation. The plaintiff al-
leged racial discrimination in the rental of
apartments in the governmentally assisted
development in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. In rejecting the plaintiff's con-
4 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
5It is interesting to note that the "state action"
theory, based on the fourteenth amendment, may
be used to the advantage of both the purchaser
and the seller. Restrictive covenants or zoning
laws based on racial discrimination violate the
purchaser's freedom to contract and acquire prop-
erty, and the seller's right to free alienation of his
property. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
6299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
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tention the court held that the assistance
rendered by the city was not "state action"
since it was not "the exertion of govern-
mental power directly to aid in discrimina-
tion or other deprivation of right. . .. ,, A
similar situation arose in Barnes v. City of
Gadsden,8 where the plaintiff, fearing repe-
tition of the theretofore common discrimin-
atory practice in the state, sought an
injunction to compel the city not to allow
discrimination in its planned redevelop-
ment program. The project, to be carried
out by a plan similar to the Stuyvesant
Town development, was to receive federal
assistance. The court denied injunctive re-
lief, refusing to impute bad faith to city
officials in carrying out the project. By the
same reasoning as applied in the Stuyvesant
case, the court concluded that after the sale
of the land to the private developer, any
discrimination practiced by the private cor-
poration would not be "state action."
In Novick v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.9 the
plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent
the defendant-owner from evicting them
7 Id. at 533- 4, 87 N.E.2d at 550. The court fur-
ther pointed out that the plaintiff's contentions
came perilously close to asserting that any state as-
sistance to an organization which discriminates,
violates the fourteenth amendment. Such is not
reasonable when one considers organizations
which discriminate, for example, by admitting
only those of one profession. Id. at 535, 87
N.E.2d at 551.
8 174 F. Supp. 64 (N.D. Ala. 1958), aff'd, 268
F.2d 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915
(1959).
9 200 Misc. 694, 108 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. Ct.
1951). Prior to the plaintiff's lease, the defendant-
lessor had covenanted in its leases against the use
of property by nonwhites; the FHA compelled the
removal of these clauses. Defendant renewed
leases as a general policy except in instances where
the terms were breached. Plaintiff as lessee had
permitted negro children to play on the premises.
When defendant refused to renew the lease,
plaintiff brought this action.
from leased premises. It was claimed that
Levitt's refusal to renew the lease was
based on racial discrimination and, appar-
ently relying on the Shelley decision, it was
asserted that the defendant could not law-
fully evict them. The court, citing Shelley,
held that the defendant was under no legal
obligation to rent and that the plaintiff had
failed to state a cause of action.
In the area of public housing, however,
the "state action" prescribed by the four-
teenth amendment has been more readily
found. Thus, in Banks v. Housing Au-
thority,10 the Housing Authority of San
Francisco applied a theory of "neighbor-
hood pattern" in determining eligibility for
admission to units of its public low-rent
development. Under this plan the Author-
ity considered the number of those unable
to obtain decent housing in the neighbor-
hood of the planned project and it con-
sidered the proportion of low income
families of one race to those of other races
so situated. It further regarded the customs
and traditions of the neighborhood with
regard to public peace and good order. For
the development in question the percentage
was seventy percent white and thirty per-
cent nonwhite. Plaintiff, a negro, sought
mandamus to compel the Authority to cer-
tify his eligibility for the development, even
though the nonwhite quota had been filled.
The court granted his request, stating that
an individual's race bears no reasonable
relation to his eligibility for low-rent hous-
ing. The "neighborhood pattern" plan was
held to be based on racial considerations
and to effectuate this plan would constitute
"state action" in contravention of the four-
teenth amendment.
Some states, in an effort to prevent dis-
10 120 Cal. App. 2d 1, 260 P.2d 668 (1st Dist.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 974 (1954).
crimination in housing in areas other than
that covered by the "state action" theory,
have enacted legislation in this area. Such
legislation ranges from mere codification of
the Shelley decision" to prohibition of dis-
crimination in any class of housing.' 2 In
other states, however, the legislation pro-
vides against discrimination in "publicly-
assisted" housing.1 3 Under this type of
statute, discrimination in privately financed
housing is not illegal.
The constitutionality of such a statute
was tested in New York State Comm'n
Against Discrimination v. Pelham Hall
Apartments, Inc.14 Pelham Hall owned an
apartment house which was financed by a
mortgage guaranteed by the FHA. Plain-
tiff filed a complaint with the Commission
on the ground that he had been refused an
apartment by the defendant because of ra-
cial prejudice. At a hearing the Commis-
sion found the allegation substantiated and
ordered the defendant to stop such activity.
Suit was brought by the Commission to
11 IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-901 (Supp. 1961).
12 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-7-5 (Supp. 1960).
13 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33071
(Supp. 1961); N. J. REV. STAT. § 18:25-5(k)
(Supp. 1961); N. Y. ExECUTIVE LAW §292(e) (1).
14 10 Misc. 2d 334, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750 (Sup. Ct.
1958). The New York constitution provides: "No
person shall . . . be subject to any discrimination
in his civil rights by any other person or any firm,
corporation, or institution, or by the State or any
agency or subdivision of the State." N. Y. CONST.
art. I, § 11. The court in the Stuyvesant Town
case, when faced with racial discrimination in
housing, found that this constitutional provision
was not applicable. The court reasoned that civil
rights meant those rights elsewhere enumerated in
the constitution or statutes. There was nowhere
enumerated a right not to be discriminated against
in housing. In 1955 the state legislature enacted
Section 298 of the N. Y. EXECUTIVE LAW (see
also N. Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW art. 2-A) creating
such a right. The court in the Pelhain Hall case,
therefore, had a constitutional mandate in support
of its opinion.
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enforce its order. The defendant claimed
the statute was unconstitutional, because it
violated his right to free use of his private
property, and also, because it violated the
"equal protection" clause since its classifi-
cation of "publicly-assisted" housing was
unreasonable. 15 It was argued on his behalf
that there was no reason to distinguish
between discrimination in "publicly-as-
sisted" houses and "private" houses and
that the law unreasonably singled him out.
The court affirmed the Commission's find-
ing. It admitted the defendant's right of
private property but also took cognizance
of the right of an individual to equality in
his public relations. The court viewed the
problem as a conflict between the right of
private property and the police power of
the state in enforcing its public policy
against discrimination. The police power
must take precedence when it is reasonably
exercised, that is, so long as the regulation
does not preclude the use of the property
for any purpose for which it can be reason-
ably adopted.", On the constitutional ques-
tion the court indicated that the "equal
protection" clause does not preclude a state
from resorting to classification for pur-
poses of legislation, and that " 'the prohibi-
tion of the .. . [clause] goes no further
than . . . [to prevent] the invidious dis-
crimination.' "17 The court found that the
classification there involved was a reason-
able step in the legislature's attempt to
15 It is interesting to note that the defendant (the
party discriminating) attacked the statute on the
basis of the "equal protection" clause. This is the
same clause used by those discriminated against
to enforce their rights.
16 New York State Comm'n Against Discrimina-
tion v. Pelham Hall Apartments, Inc., 10 Misc. 2d
334, 341, 170 N.Y.S.2d 750, 757 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
'7 Id. at 343, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 759, quoting Wil-
liamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S.
483, 489 (1955).
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abolish discrimination in housing.
In passing upon the validity of legislation
claimed to offend against the equal protec-
tion clause because operating solely with
respect to particular classes of persons or
property, the test is whether or not the
classification rests upon some reasonable
basis bearing in mind the subject matter and
the object of the legislation.' 8
The constitutionality of a similar statute
in New Jersey was attacked on the same
grounds in Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division
Against Discrimination.'9 The court upheld
the statute on reasoning analagous to that
used in Pelham Hall.
In the O'Meara case, where the Wash-
ington statute prohibited discrimination in
"publicly-assisted" housing, 20 the defendant
contended that the statute was unconstitu-
tional because the classification of "pub-
licly-assisted" housing violated the "equal
protection" clause.2 1 Justice Foster adopted
the opinion of the court below, which, after
taking note of the Pelham Hall and Levitt
decisions, proceeded to apply the test set
forth by Mr. Justice Holmes in Patsone v.
Pennsylvania.2 2 Mr. Justice Holmes writ-
ing for that Court said: "[A] State may
classify with reference to the evil to be
prevented, and.., if the class discriminated
against is or reasonably might be consid-
ered to define those from whom the evil
mainly is to be feared, it properly may be
picked out."'23
Applying this test the lower court opin-
ion adopted by the majority declared that
there was no reason to suppose that per-
sons with FHA mortgages are any more
Is Id. at 343, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
19 56 N. J. Super. 542, 153 A.2d 700 (App. Div.
1959), afl'd, 31 N. J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960).
20 WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.030 (1957).
21 See note 15 supra.
22 232 U.S. 138 (1914).
23 Id. at 144.
likely to discriminate than those who
have conventional mortgages. The statute
thereby gives a privilege or immunity to
those who, in dealing with similar parcels
of real estate, do not have "publicly-as-
sisted" financing. The Court then concluded
that "the classification is arbitrary and
capricious and bears no reasonable rela-
tion to the evil which is sought to be elimi-
nated," 24 and held that it violated the
fourteenth amendment.
Justice Mallery in his concurring opinion
cited five reasons why the statute violated
the Washington constitution. First, the
Washington constitution provides against
private property being taken for private
use. While the statute classifies the prop-
erty as "publicly-assisted," he pointed out
that it is in fact the private property of
O'Meara being taken for the private use
of Jones. Second, the state constitution
grants original jurisdiction to the superior
court in all cases involving the title or pos-
session of real property. The statute, in
effect, violates this provision because it
gives the State Board Against Discrimina-
tion the power to order a party to sell his
property. Third, the constitution provides
that no property be taken except by due
process of law. The statute provides that
the State Board which investigates and
prosecutes complaints is also to hear the
case. Justice Mallery indicated that since
the tribunal is not independent and impar-
tial, the elementary requirements of due
process are not met. Fourth, the State
Board is empowered to make suitable rules
and regulations and to set policy, to investi-
gate and prosecute complaints, and to hear
and dispose of the case. This combination
24 O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Dis-
crimination, - Wash. 2d -, - 365 P.2d 1, 5
(1961).
